Contact: Josh Holly; 202.226.3988
Hunter Statement on 21st Century Seapower Strategies
Washington D.C. – The House Armed Services Committee heard testimony today on the United States’ long-term seapower strategy. Witnesses testifying before the committee included the top officers of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. Ranking Republican Duncan Hunter (R-CA) released the following opening statement for the committee’s hearing:
“Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning Admiral Roughead, General Conway, and Admiral Allen. It’s a pleasure to have you here today to learn more about the new maritime strategy. I’d like to join in Ike’s welcome to Admiral Allen and also give a special welcome to Admiral Roughead who appears before this committee for the first time as the Chief of Naval Operations. Congratulations, Admiral, and best wishes to you in your current assignment.
“I understand that the strategy was developed in a non-resource constrained environment and is not intended to replace the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan or budget planning documents. For that, I applaud you. For some time, I have been concerned that the strategy of the Department of Defense is driven by the Office of Management and Budget. As you have heard me say in the past, I believe the greatest failing of the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was the artificial constraint placed upon it by budget caps. I understand that the availability of resources must shape our programs. But in order to make educated decisions, we have to start with a baseline understanding of the global security environment and what capabilities we need to protect the national security interests of the United States with minimal risk.
“Only after determining requirements can we begin to make trade-offs based on resource constraints in such a way that we understand where we are accepting risk. That is why this committee initiated the Armed Services Committee Defense Review in parallel with the QDR to establish a framework for members to consider the recommendations of the QDR.
“The irony is that with all the personnel available to the Department of Defense (DoD), the work that this committee did—by taking a different, non-resource constrained approach—turns out to have been more representative of what the services now say that they need. I look forward to hearing more from you today about how you intend to translate this strategy into service specific requirements, which will form the basis of your request for resources.
“However, with that said, the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard don’t have a good track record with regard to managing the resources that have been provided. You’re not alone, but that does not excuse the situation we find ourselves in. On one hand, we have a critical need for modernization and DoD’s planned investment in new systems has doubled from 2001 to today—from around $750 billion to nearly $1.5 trillion. On the other hand, there has been cost escalation on nearly everything from aircraft, to ground vehicles, to submarines and, of course, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
“The GAO has found many times over that acquisition programs are too often started with immature technologies and without stable designs. Every time one of these programs experiences a Nunn-McCurdy breach or the cost of a ship more than doubles, the support for additional resources and modernization wanes.
“Admiral Roughead, when you and I had an opportunity to meet the other day, we discussed this. The LCS was supposed to be a small, fast craft that we could build in large numbers, to operate in the littorals. Instead, they’re over 400 feet—the size of World War II era destroyers—operate at 45 knots, cost nearly half a billion dollars a piece. To date, we’ve only been able to partially build 2. I fear that the Navy’s talk of transformation is nothing more than a speech senior leaders give at the Rotary Club. You’ve had the opportunity to embrace transformation and you’ve chosen not to. Now, I’m not saying that a craft like Seafighter, developed by the Office of Naval Research, is the final answer. But here is a ship that is a quarter of the price, faster, smaller and with much of the same capability as LCS—and the Navy has done everything in its power to kill it.
“Gentlemen, with all due respect, I am pleased that you have cooperated to develop this strategy. I am supportive of its tenets. But you’re not going to be able to deliver if you cannot afford the force that will make this strategy a reality. What are you planning to do to get control on requirements and to enable the acquisition community to more effectively manage their programs?
“Lastly, I look forward to hearing more about a few specific elements in the strategy. First, the strategy states, ‘Today, the United States and its partners find themselves competing for global influence in an era in which they are unlikely to be fully at war or fully at peace.’ General Conway, I am surprised that the Marine Corps would agree with such a characterization. Is the Marine Corps not fully at war? Are we being naïve to think that we are in an era without the possibility of full war? If so, how does this affect your need for resources—in terms of end strength and weapons systems?
“Second, the strategy advocates the concentration of forward deployed forces in the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean. At what expense? Where will we take risk if we pursue such a strategy? Also, is this consistent with the recommendation contained in the strategy to establish a persistent global presence of US forces? How will you accomplish both?
“Finally, I would be interested in learning how the growing influence of China, the expanding Chinese shipbuilding capacity, and the increasing capability and numbers of Chinese submarines and airpower shaped the new maritime strategy. How is this strategy different as a result of these factors?
“In conclusion, please allow me to thank you for your testimony today and your service to this country. We are grateful and applaud your efforts to maintain the strength of the greatest sea services in the world.”
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